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Three main frameworks have been widely used to study product diﬀerentia-
tion and monopolistic competition: representative consumer, discrete choice
and spatial models. In representative consumer and discrete choice models,
it is understood that equilibrium product variety could either be excessive
or insuﬃcient or optimal depending on the model conﬁguration.1 In spatial
models such as Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979), however, analysis shows
that there is always excessive entry. This result became known as the excess
entry theorem. Matsumura and Okamura (2006) extend this result for a
large set of transportation costs and production technologies.2
One drawback of standard spatial models such as Hotelling (1929) and Salop
(1979) is that consumer demand is completely inelastic. Each consumer
demands a single unit of a diﬀerentiated product.3 The present paper lifts
this restrictive assumption in the context of the Salop model and investigates
the implications of price-dependent demand for the excess entry theorem.
To this aim, we incorporate a demand function with a constant elasticity into
the Salop framework. We ﬁnd that the number of entrants in a free-entry
equilibrium is the lower the more elastic demand is. We also ﬁnd that only
when demand is suﬃciently inelastic, there is excess entry. Otherwise, entry
is insuﬃcient. In the limiting case when the demand elasticity approaches
unity, the market becomes a monopoly. Thus, the excess entry theorem
is only valid for suﬃciently inelastic demand and hence, the assumption
of inelastic demand, typically employed, is not an innocuous one. As a
consequence of our welfare analysis we point out when and how a public
policy can be desirable. In an extension, we broaden our result with a more
general transportation cost function.
Our model setup is closely related to Anderson and de Palma (2000). The
purpose of their paper is to develop a model that integrates features of spatial
models where competition is localized and representative consumer models
where competition between ﬁrms is global. The formulation of the individual
demand function is the same as in Anderson and de Palma (2000).4 They
also consider a constant elasticity demand function. However, the diﬀerence
1See, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Pettengill (1979), Lancaster (1975), Sat-
tinger (1984), Hart (1985) among many others.
2They do point out that there are also some situations in which entry can be insuﬃcient.
3The assumption of inelastic demand can be a realistic one in the case of some durable
goods, e.g. houses, etc. However, in case of nondurables, e.g. groceries, etc, the assump-
tion seems less plausible.
4Our model is the special case of Anderson and de Palma (2000) when eliminating the
taste component in their utility function. Thus, the present paper considers a pure spatial
model, while Anderson and de Palma (2000) analyze a model that has features of spatial
and representative consumer models.
4lies in the perspective of the papers. Their focus is on the interaction be-
tween local and global competition, while the present paper focuses on the
implications of price-dependent demand on the excess entry result in spatial
models.
Other approaches to introduce price-dependent demand into spatial models
are Boeckem (1994), Rath and Zhao (2001) and Peitz (2002).5 The ﬁrst
two papers consider variants of the Hotelling framework. Boeckem (1994)
introduces heterogenous consumers with respect to reservation prices. De-
pending on the price charged by ﬁrms some consumers choose not to buy
a product. The paper by Rath and Zhao (2001) introduces elastic demand
in the Hotelling framework by assuming that the quantity demanded by
each consumer depends on the price charged. The authors propose a util-
ity function that is quadratic in the quantity of the diﬀerentiated product
leading to a linear demand function. In contrast to those two models we
build on the Salop model as we are interested in the relationship between
price-dependent demand and entry into the market. Our approach is closer
to Rath and Zhao (2001) as we also assume that each consumer has a down-
ward sloping demand for the diﬀerentiated good. However, our demand
function takes on a diﬀerent functional form which has the advantage of
yielding tractable results. Peitz (2002) features unit-elastic demand both in
Hotelling and Salop settings but focuses on conditions for existence of Nash
equilibrium in prices. He does not consider entry decisions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
presents the analysis of the model. Section 4 analyzes the welfare outcome
and policy implications. An extension with more general transportation cost
functions is provided in section 5. Section 6 summarizes.
2 The model
There is a unit mass of consumers who are located on a circle with circum-
ference one. The location of a consumers is denoted by x. In contrast to
Salop (1979), consumers are not limited to buy a single unit of the diﬀeren-
tiated good. The amount they purchase depends on the price. We propose
the following utility function which leads to a demand function with a con-
5A recent paper by Peng and Tabuchi (2007) combines a model of spatial competition
with taste for variety in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In their setup, the quantity
demanded also depends on the price. However, their focus is a diﬀerent one. They study
the incentives of how much variety to oﬀer and how many stores to establish. A paper by
Hamilton et al. (1994) analyzes elastic demand in a model with quantity competition. In
contrast to the present note the authors employ a transportation costs per unit of quantity
purchased.











d − t ∗ dist
 
+ qh if consumes the diﬀerentiated product
qh otherwise.
(1)
The utility derived by the consumption of the diﬀerentiated good consists of
three parts. There is a gross utility for consuming this good (V ). The second
utility component depends on the quantity consumed (qd). The parameter  
—which lies between (0,1)—will later turn out to be the demand elasticity.
Finally, consumers have to incur transportation costs if the product’s at-
tributes do not match consumers’ locations. We assume that transportation
costs do not depend on the quantity consumed. Furthermore, we assume
that transportation costs are linear in distance.6 In section 5, we will lift
this assumption and cover a broader class of transportation cost functions,
namely power transportation costs. The variable qh denotes the quantity of
a homogenous good which serves as a numeraire good. The utility is lin-
ear in this commodity. Additionally, we make the assumption that the gross
utility of the diﬀerentiated good (V ) is large enough such that no consumers
abstains from buying the diﬀerentiated product.7
Each consumer has an exogenous income of Y which he can divide between
the consumption of the diﬀerentiated good and the numeraire good. The
price of the diﬀerentiated good is pd, while the price of the numeraire is
normalized to one. This leads to the following budget constraint:
Y = pd ∗ qd + qh. (2)
Consumers maximize their utility (1) under their budget constraint (2).
Then, demand for the diﬀerentiated product and the numeraire is:
ˆ qd = p− 
d , (3)
ˆ qh = Y − p1− 
d . (4)
6This allows a direct comparison to Salop (1979) model because the transportation
cost is linear in that paper as well.
7This helps us to avoid situations in which a ﬁrm could be a local monopoly, hence the
kink in the ﬁrm’s demand curve.
6The demand for the diﬀerentiated good exhibits a constant demand elasticity
of  . A higher value of   corresponds to more elastic demand. The limit
case of   → 0 corresponds to completely inelastic demand. Inserting these
demand functions into equation (1) gives the indirect utility a consumer
derives from consuming the diﬀerentiated product from a certain ﬁrm:
ˆ U = V + Y −
1
1 −  
p1− 
d − t ∗ dist. (5)
There are n ﬁrms that oﬀer the diﬀerentiated product. We assume that these
ﬁrms are located equidistantly on the circle. Hence, the distance between
two neighboring ﬁrms is 1
n. Consumers choose to buy the diﬀerentiated prod-
uct from the ﬁrm which oﬀers them the highest utility. Given the symmetric
structure of the model, we seek for a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore we
derive demand of a representative ﬁrm i. The marginal consumer is the
consumer who is indiﬀerent between choosing ﬁrm i and an adjacent ﬁrm.
When ﬁrm i charges a price pi while the remaining ﬁrms charge a price p,
the marginal consumer is implicitly given by
V + Y −
1
1 −  
p1− 
i − t¯ x = V + Y −
1
1 −  












p1−  − p1− 
i
2(1 −  )t
. (7)
As each ﬁrm faces two adjacent ﬁrms, the number of consumers choosing to
buy from ﬁrm i is 2¯ x. According to equation (3), each consumer buys an
amount of ˆ qi = p− 
i . Hence total demand at ﬁrm i is:
Di =2 ¯ x ∗ p− 
i . (8)
In contrast to the Salop model, total demand consists now of two parts:
market share and quantity per consumer.
3 Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium. We start by deriving equilibrium
prices for a given number of ﬁrms in the market. In a second step, we seek
to determine the number of ﬁrms that enter.
73.1 Price equilibrium
We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms charge the same
price. Assuming zero production costs, the proﬁt of a representative ﬁrm i
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Maximizing proﬁts with respect to the price pi and assuming symmetry
among all ﬁrms leads to the following equilibrium price:8
p∗ =
 






The corresponding quantity purchased by each consumer then is
q∗ =
 
(1 −  )
t
n
 −  
1− 
. (11)
As in the Salop model, the equilibrium price increases in transportation
costs and decreases in the number of ﬁrms in the market. Conversely, the
quantity purchased by each consumer rises with the number of ﬁrms and
decreases with transportation costs. More interesting is the impact of the
demand elasticity on the equilibrium price and quantity. Diﬀerentiation










(1 −  )t
n
 e . (13)
where e denotes the Euler number. A higher demand elasticity has an
ambiguous impact on equilibrium price and quantity. It can lead to a higher
price as well as to a lower price. The intuition behind this result lies in the
fact that ﬁrms can attract additional demand in two ways, via a larger
market share and a larger quantity per consumer. Note, however, that the
8For the proof of the existence of a symmetric price equilibrium, the reader is referred
to Anderson and de Palma (2000).
8revenue per customer p∗q∗ =
(1− )t
n decreases in the price elasticity. In the
limiting case of   → 1, revenue per customer approaches zero.
In the equilibrium with a given number of ﬁrms in the market, each ﬁrm
makes a proﬁt of
Π∗ =
t(1 −  )
n2 . (14)
The impact of the demand elasticity on ﬁrms’ proﬁts is unambiguous. A
larger demand elasticity reduces proﬁts. This is due to the result that rev-
enue per customer decreases with the demand elasticity and that the market
share is constant at 1
n in equilibrium. Hence, product market competition is
tougher as consumers react stronger to price changes. Higher transportation
costs and a smaller number of active ﬁrms increase proﬁts.
Result 1 For a given number of ﬁrms, proﬁts decrease with the demand
elasticity.
3.2 Entry
Until now the analysis treated the number of ﬁrms which oﬀer diﬀerentiated
products as exogenously given. We now investigate the number of active
ﬁrms when it is endogenously determined by the zero proﬁt condition. We
assume that to enter, a ﬁrm has to incur an entry cost or ﬁxed cost of
f. Additionally, we treat the number of entrants as a continuous variable.




t(1 −  )
f
. (15)
The comparative static results concerning transportation costs and ﬁxed
costs are as expected. Higher transportation costs lead to more entry while
higher ﬁxed costs to less entry. The interesting result concerns the impact
of the demand elasticity:
Result 2 The number of entrants decreases in the demand elasticity.
A larger demand elasticity leads to less entry into the market. The reason
for this result is that a higher elasticity leads to lower proﬁts for any given
number of ﬁrms (see result 1).
9Corresponding price and quantity in a free-entry equilibrium are:
pc =
 √




1−  , (16)
qc =
 √
1 −  
 
tf
 −  
1−  . (17)
Higher transportation costs and higher ﬁxed costs lead to higher prices and
to lower quantities. As in the equilibrium for a given number of ﬁrms, the
impact of the demand elasticity on price and quantity is ambiguous. More
elastic demand may lead to higher or lower prices and quantities.
The model has interesting results in the limiting cases.
Result 3 i) With   → 0, the model reduces to the Salop model. ii) As
  → 1, the market is monopolized.
When demand is completely inelastic,   → 0, the model reduces to the Salop
model. Thus that model is a special case of the present one. As the demand
elasticity approaches unity, a monopoly is the outcome. Competition in the
market is so tough that as soon as more than one ﬁrm enters the market
proﬁts are driven to zero (see equation (14)).
4 Welfare
This section considers the welfare and policy implications. We ask whether
there is excess entry into the market as it is the case in models with inelastic
demand.
In contrast to models with inelastic demand, we have to consider prices in
our welfare analysis as they have an impact on the quantity purchased and
hence on welfare. We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of consumer utility
and industry proﬁts:
W = V + Y −
1
1 −  





      
Consumer welfare
+ p1−  − fn       
Industry proﬁts
. (18)
We determine social welfare given that prices are chosen by ﬁrms as given
in the price equilibrium by equation (10). Inserting these prices gives








t(1 −  )
n
− fn. (19)
4.1 Socially optimal entry




t(1 + 4 )
4f
. (20)
Comparing the optimal number of ﬁrms, nw, with the outcome under free
entry, nc, the following result can be established:
Result 4 When  <3
8 there is excess entry. When  >3
8 there is insuﬃ-
cient entry. When   = 3
8 entry is optimal.
The previous result shows that the result of excess entry in the Salop model
does not hold when demand is elastic. In the model with elastic demand
whether there is too much entry or not enough depends on the demand
elasticity. Whenever demand is suﬃciently inelastic, there is excess entry as
is the case in the Salop model (  → 0). However, if the demand elasticity
exceeds 3
8, there is insuﬃcient entry into the market. Only when   = 3
8,
entry coincides with the socially optimal number. Thus, the excess entry
theorem in spatial models depends crucially on the assumption of inelastic
demand.
4.2 Policy implications
Here we derive some policy implications of our welfare analysis. Suppose
that a government agency may either charge a fee against or grant a subsidy
to each entry, e.g. license fee or start-up funds, respectively. Let s denote
the value of such a transfer. When s<0 we call it a subsidy, and when
s>0 we call it an entry fee.





t(1 −  )
f + s
. (21)
9The second-order condition for maximization is satisﬁed: −
t(1+4 )
2n3 < 0.
11This, of course, follows directly from equation (15) by adjusting the ﬁxed cost
term accordingly. By setting equation (21) equal to (20), we can determine
the value of s that induces optimal entry into the market. This value is
s = f
3 − 8 
1+4  
. (22)
The following result summarizes the policy implication.
Result 5 i) When  <3
8, a government agency should charge an entry fee
to reduce excess entry; ii) when  >3
8, a government agency should subsidize
entry.
By such a transfer scheme, a government agency could eﬀectively inﬂuence
the number of active ﬁrms.
5 Power transportation costs
This section reconsiders the analysis assuming a more general transportation
cost function. Instead of linear transportation costs, we now assume power
transportation costs txβ with β ≥ 1. This functional form is also considered
by Anderson et al. (1992) and Matsumura and Okamura (2006) which both
show that the excess entry theorem always holds in the case of inelastic
demand.10 Our analysis will show that their result depends very much on
the assumption of inelastic demand.
Following the same steps as in section 3, we can derive the number of entrants
in a free-entry equilibrium and the socially optimal number. The derivation
of these results is given in appendix A.
The number of entrants in a free-entry equilibrium is
nc =
 














10Note that existence of price equilibrium is not ensured if β is too high. See Anderson
et al. (1992, Ch. 6).
12We denote by ¯   =
1+2β
2(1+β)2 the demand elasticity such that optimal and
competitive entry coincides. This leads to the following result:
Result 6 Suppose that transportation costs are of the power function form
txβ. Then we have that i) there is excess entry if  <¯  (β) and insuﬃcient
entry if  >¯  (β), and ii) ¯  (β) decreases in β.
The ﬁrst part of the result generalizes result 4 for the case of a more general
transportation cost function. It states that as long as demand is suﬃciently
inelastic the excess entry theorem still holds. Otherwise it does not hold.
The second part of the result, follows directly as ∂¯  
∂β = −
β
(1+β)3 < 0. It states
that the interval of demand elasticities for which the excess entry theorem
holds shrinks with β.
6 Conclusion
The present paper introduces elastic demand in the Salop (1979) model and
investigates if the excess entry theorem still holds. We propose a utility
function that leads to a demand function with constant elasticity. We ﬁnd
that a larger demand elasticity leads to less entry into the market. This is
a hypothesis that can be tested empirically. Markets with higher demand
elasticity should oﬀer less product variety. In the limiting case of a unit
demand elasticity the market outcome is a monopoly. Turning to welfare
analysis, we show that when demand is suﬃciently inelastic there is excess
entry. However, when demand is suﬃciently elastic the number of entrants
is lower than the socially optimal number. Further, we provide conditions
on when and how a government intervention can be desirable. We also show
that our results hold with more general transportation cost functions.
A Derivation with power transportation costs
Here we provide the derivation of the results for the model with power
transportation costs. The derivation follows Anderson et al. (1992, Ch. 6),
but extended to price-dependent demand.




1 −  
p1− 
i − t¯ xβ = −
1
1 −  







13In contrast to the case of linear transportation costs, it is not possible to give
a closed form for the marginal consumer. However, by total diﬀerentiation








n − ¯ x)β−1)
. (26)
As we are interested in a symmetric equilibrium we can evaluate this ex-
pression at the symmetric equilibrium, that is at ¯ x = 1










Proﬁts for the representative ﬁrm i is Πi =2 ¯ xp1− 
i . The ﬁrst-order con-
dition for proﬁt maximization and assuming symmetry gives the following
equilibrium prices for a given number of ﬁrms in the market:
p =
 






For β = 1, this gives the results of our base model, and for   = 0, we get the
results of Anderson et al. (1992, Ch. 6). Each ﬁrm earns a proﬁt of
(1 −  )tβ21−β
nβ+1 − f. (29)
The number of ﬁrms that enter in a free-entry equilibrium is determined via
the zero-proﬁt condition. This leads to the following number of entrants:
nc =
 





With power transportation costs total welfare can be expressed as:




(1 + β)nβ2β +
(1 −  )tβ21−β
nβ − fn. (31)









Comparison with the number of ﬁrms in a free-entry equilibrium shows that
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